

2025:PHHC:119275



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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

CRM-M-40666-2025

Date of decision: September 03, 2025

Jyoti Manchanda

....Petitioner

versus

State of Haryana and another

....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:- Mr. Ashish Naik, Advocate for the petitioner
(presence marked through video-conferencing).

Mr. Tarun Aggarwal, Additional AG Haryana.

None for respondent No.2.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR No.0024 dated 09.01.2023, under Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC'), registered at Police Station Sector 8, Faridabad as also all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom as the main complaint case bearing No.NACT/10569/2028 dated 21.11.2018 titled as '*Rajdeep Singh vs. Jyoti Manchanda*' already stands dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 06.03.2023 (Annexure P-3) filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (for short 'NI Act').

2. The impugned FIR (as set out in the petition in hand) reads thus:-

"CNR No: HRFB030334302018 CIS No: NACT/ 10569/2018 RAJDEEP SINGH VS JYOTI MANCHANDA etc. Present: Manish Kishore Sh. BALU SINGH, Advocate for complainant. Accused absent. Proclamation issued against the accused received back duly served and

published by way of publication as required under Section 82 Cr.P.C. Mandatory period of thirty days has also been expired as per report dated 29.10.2022 as separate statement of executing constable was also recorded on previous date of hearing. Heard, the court is satisfied that presence of accused could not be secured by ordinary means. Accordingly, accused Jyoti Manchanda, wife of Sh. Shakti Manchanda, resident of House no. 1A-208, NH- 1, Faridabad, is hereby declared as proclaimed person. At this stage let preliminary evidence be read as evidence under Section 299 Cr.P.C. and as complainant do not want to further lead any evidence under Section 299 Cr.P.C. Therefore, same is hereby closed by court order. An intimation with a copy of this order be sent to the SHO concerned and PO Staff with a direction to register a case Her section 174A IPC and to take necessary legal action under due INTimation to this court on or before 09.01.2023. Further the concerned SHO is directed to ascertain property details of the proclaimed person in order to carry out the proceedings as per Section-83. Cr.PC. 1973, the concerned SHO can investigate the present matter by taking into account the documents for residential proof etc: submitted by the proclaimed person while opening the account with the concerned bank of which cheque in question in present case was issued. List of property as well as alternative bank account of accused not provided by the complainant. Considering the aforesaid facts the only option left with this court is to attach the existing bank account of accused as per cheque in question, details of which are available on case record i.e. account bearing no.61307508445 with bank namely State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, 26-Railway Road, Near Bata Chowk, Faridabad- 121001. A copy of this order be sent to Manager of the concerned bank, so as to attach the bank account of the accused and file compliance report. Now, to come up on 09.01.2023 for awaiting FIR.. Further complainant is directed to file list of movable and immovable property of accused on date fixed for taking further action as per law. Date of Order: 30.11.2022 Manish SD (Tarun Chaudhary) Judicial Magistrate - 1st Class UID NO. HR0469. Today at Police Station: Today one order from the Court of SHRI Tarun Chaudhary, JMIC FARIDABAD was received by post, on which after registration of FIR regarding office, copies are being prepared from computer and being sent to concerned officials through post. Copy of statement alongwith with police file is being sent to I/C PP SEC 7 FBD through post for further proceedings. Note: Due to not having ID of I/C PP SEC 7 FBD in CCTNS, FIR was registered in the ID of ASI RAJIV KUMAR in the presence of SI Surrender. Note: CCTNS FIR was prepared with delay due to server down.”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal complaint filed against the petitioner (herein) under Section 138 of the NI Act, in proceedings whereof the petitioner was declared as a proclaimed person & hence the impugned FIR came to be got registered against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order as also the proceedings declaring the petitioner as a proclaimed person are manifestly illegal and against the mandatory provisions of law. It has been further iterated that the criminal

complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, has already been withdrawn as the rival parties had entered into a settlement and hence no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings *qua* the impugned FIR. To buttress this aspect of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate which reads thus:

“File taken up today as an application to summon the case file from record room and seeking permission to withdraw the same is moved by the complainant through counsel.

Summoned record received. It be restored at its original position. At this stage complainant suffered a separate statement that he has compromised with the accused as per deed of compromise and he has received the cheque amount. Now he does not want to pursue further with the present complaint, therefore, he withdraw the present complaint. Statement recorded. Complainant is duly identified by his counsel. A copy of compromise deed placed on the case file.

Heard. In view of the statements made by the complainant, present complaint is dismissed as withdrawn. File be consigned to the records after due compliance.”

On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed for grant of petition in hand.

4. Conversely, learned State counsel has submitted that the impugned order was passed solely on the ground of absence of the petitioner. He has raised submission in tandem with the reply dated 27.08.2025 by way of an affidavit of Jitesh Kumar, HPS, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Ballabgarh Faridabad, filed in Court today. He, however, does not dispute the fact that the parties have amicably resolved the matter and the main complaint stands dismissed as withdrawn.

5. None appears on behalf of respondent No.2 despite service reported to be effected upon him.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the paper-book.

7. The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising therefrom) under Section 174-A of the IPC deserves to be quashed in the factual matrix of the present case.

8. At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of this Court passed in *CRM-M-51049-2019* titled as *Mohammad Hanif Attari vs. State of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023*, relevant whereof reads as under:

“3. In view the fact that after the principle proceedings in which the petitioner was declared Proclaimed Offender stand concluded, the question would arise is: 'whether in the given circumstances, proceedings under Section 174A of the IPC pursuant to FIR No.425 dated 17th of November, 2017 can be allowed to continue.

4. The question framed ibid is no more res integra and already stands answered by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-43813-2018 titled as "Baldev Chand Bansal v. State of Haryana and another" vide order dated 29.01.2019, which held as under:

“Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 filed under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof as well as order dated 24.10.2016 passed by the trial Court vide which a direction was issued to register the aforesaid FIR.”

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Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions rendered by this Court in "Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli and another (supra), 2017, (3) L.A.R.584, Microqual Techno Limited and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2015 (32) RCR (Criminal) 790 and "Rajneesh Khanna v. State of Haryana and another" 2017 (3) L.A.R. 555 wherein in an identical circumstance, this Court has held that since the main petition filed under Section 138 of the Act stands withdrawn in view of an amicable settlement between the parties, therefore, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A of IPC shall be nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

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In view of the same, I find merit in the present petition and accordingly, present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.10.2016 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Panchkula as well as FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 registered under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof, are hereby quashed.”

5. Same is the view of another Co-ordinate Bench in the "Ashok Madaan v. State of Haryana and another" reported as 2020 (4) RCR (Criminal) 87, wherein it has been held that:

"No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that the offence under Section 174A I.P.C. is independent of the main case, therefore, merely because the main case has been dismissed for want of prosecution, the present petition cannot be

allowed, however, keeping in view the fact that the present FIR was registered only on account of absence from the proceedings in the main case which had been subsequently regularised by the court while granting bail to the petitioner, the default stood condoned. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A L.P.C. shall be abuse of the process of court.

7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 446 dated 21.08.2017, registered under Section 174A I.P.C. at Police Station Kotwali, District Faridabad, as well as consequential proceedings shall stand quashed.”

8.1. More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as ***Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another***, Criminal Appeal No.4359 of 2024 decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:

“7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is nullified i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of subsequent developments is no longer required to be presented before a Court of law. Then, can the prosecution still proceed against such a person for having not appeared before a Court during the time that the process was in effect. The answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following reasons:-

(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by proclamation...”. This implies that the very instance at which a person is directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section comes into play;

(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section, and therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C. being in effect;

(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be started post the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the said proclamation is no longer in effect.

*(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e., that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in **Mukesh Bhatia v.State (NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023; Divya Verma v. State 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr. v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr. CrI. M.C. No.1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May, 2022** For the reasons afore-stated, we agree with the findings made in these judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands clarified that we have not commented on the merits of the cases.*

(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in connection with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is initiated and in the said offence the accused stands, subsequently, acquitted, it would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the trial under such offence, to take note of such a development and treat the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close, should such a prayer be made and the circumstances of the case so warrant.

*8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence.
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However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned FIR (therein) under Section 174-A of the IPC since, *inter alia*, the original offence in the form of criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 in the said case had been settled and withdrawn by the rival parties.

9. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/ 428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate that it should not apply the law in an austere, academic and exacting technical manner, without considering its practical implications. The Law is not merely a set of programmed, *nailed-to-the-ground* rules, to be applied without context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that its purpose is to ensure substantive justice between the parties. The statutory provision of Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Daljit Singh's* case (supra), unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the IPC does not *proprio vigore* become liable to be quashed, in case the rival parties have entered into a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has been compromised and quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the same time, the factum of the criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of proceedings whereof) having been compromised/settled, is indubitably, a relevant factor to be considered while dealing with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 174-A of IPC. This fact assumes greater significance considering that the initial proceedings pertain exclusively to a private criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881, which the legislature has expressly classified as a compoundable offence. Such litigation, especially in the backdrop of original offence having been compromised will have an adverse impact on

the overburdened Court-dockets. Allowing such prosecution, when initial complaint has been settled/withdrawn would undermine the legislative intent and distort the remedial nature of Section 138 of NI Act of 1881. It would tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality, and justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may sometimes lead to unjust outcomes that also contradict the law's underlined purpose. Therefore, the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of Law with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach underscores Law's role as an apparatus for fostering societal harmony and addressing the real-world complexities, efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere literal/technical compliance.

10. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/ Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may intervene to quash the criminal proceedings, recognizing the continuation thereof would be non-productive and unjust in the given circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in

fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posits of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice *nay* substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.

11. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and circumstances of the case in hand; especially the original offence being an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the original offence alleged to have been committed in the year 2018, the subject matter of the original offence having been settled amicably between the parties and the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NIT Act having been withdrawn on the basis of such settlement/compromise; this Court

deems it appropriate that the impugned FIR as also all proceedings emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.

12. It is, hence, directed as under:

(i) Instant petition is allowed;

(ii) The FIR No.0024 dated 09.01.2023, under Section 174-A of IPC, registered at Police Station Sector 8, Faridabad as also all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed;

(iii) All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

September 03, 2025

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Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No